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ABSTRACT 
Kant’s account of reason – both the practical account and the theoretical account – can 
give help in addressing the long-standing problems in epistemology of understanding 
what knowledge is and why it is distinctly valuable.  In this paper, I address these 
particular epistemic concerns in three main parts: 1) I give an overview of Kant’s account 
of practical reason and argue for the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason; 
2) I present an analysis of knowledge from Kant’s account of (practical and theoretical) 
reason and suggest some intellectual counterparts to some of the key concepts in Kant’s 
ethical theory that line up with his account of theoretical reason; 3) I address four major 
challenges regarding the value of knowledge and present one promising approach to these 
challenges offered by Duncan Pritchard. I argue that Pritchard’s account fails to 
adequately address the four key challenges, then apply my Kantian analysis of knowledge 
to the problems to show how it is superior in addressing them. The positive account I 
offer here is unique in its explicit relying on duty and the Kantian universalizability 
criterion of reason. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Virtue epistemology has recently received much attention for using virtue ethical theories 
as an analogue for epistemic virtue.  In this way, virtue ethics gives us new tools to 
approach both new and longstanding problems in epistemology.   
 This recent work done in virtue epistemology makes obvious that ethics and 
epistemology have some things in common.  There are at least two things that link ethical 
theories with normative epistemology: 1) both are concerned with normativity (both are 
subject to the demands of rationality; epistemology is at least concerned with what is 
‘reasonable’ – or justified -- to believe), and 2) agents can be commended or rebuffed 
both for the rightness/wrongness and goodness/badness of their actions (or willingness to 
act) given a set of alternatives for action and for the rightness/wrongness and 
goodness/badness of holding certain beliefs in the face of possible justification or lack 
thereof.   In ethics, the tradition of practical reason asks the distinctively normative 
question of what one ought to do, or what would be best to do, given a set of alternatives 
for action.  Agents aim to assess and weigh their reasons for action, which are the 
considerations that stand in favor of or opposed to the alternative courses of action that 
are available to them.  The kind of reason associated with epistemology – what we might 
term ‘theoretical reason’ – can also be interpreted as asking a primarily normative 
question.  That is, theoretical reflection asks what one ought to believe.  In theoretical 
reasoning, agents attempt to assess and weigh reasons for belief, which are the 
considerations that stand in favor of or opposed to particular judgments one might 
conclude about the way the world is.  Both practical and theoretical reasoning, then, are 
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concerned with normative regulation: practical reason with the regulation of action, and 
theoretical reason with the regulation of belief. 
 Viewing the overlap between ethics and epistemology in terms of the normative 
aims of practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning allows us to ask whether ethical 
theories other than virtue ethics might lend us aid in solving epistemic problems, too.  
Perhaps the most significant moral theory with enduring appeal and in the tradition of 
practical reason is Kant’s deontology.  
 In this paper, I use Kant’s ethical theory to give insight into some major epistemic 
questions.  One long-standing project in epistemology is the attempt to understand what 
knowledge is and why it is distinctly valuable.  I attempt to advance this project in three 
main parts: 1) I give an overview of Kant’s account of practical reason and argue for the 
primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason; 2) I present an analysis of knowledge 
from Kant’s account of (practical and theoretical) reason and suggest some intellectual 
counterparts to some of the key concepts in Kant’s ethical theory that line up with his 
account of theoretical reason; 3) I address four major challenges regarding the value of 
knowledge and present one promising approach to these challenges offered by Duncan 
Pritchard. I argue that Pritchard’s account fails to adequately address the four key 
challenges, then apply my Kantian analysis of knowledge to the problems to show how it 
is superior in addressing them.  I conclude with big picture implications of my analysis, 
admit some of the limitations of my work, and suggest some areas for further research. 
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PART I: OVERVIEW OF KANT’S ETHICAL THEORY:  
GOOD WILL, DUTY, AND UNIVERSALIZABILITY 
In this section, I’ll outline a common and widely accepted interpretation of Kant’s moral 
philosophy based on practical reason.1   
 According to Kant, imperatives are the formulas of the commanding principles of 
practical reason.  Imperatives are expressed by an ought and state that some action 
possible to an agent would either be good to do or good to refrain from doing.  Reasons 
for acting on any imperative derive either from pure reason or from inclinations 
(emotions, desires, etc.).   
 For Kant, there are two types of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical.  
Imperatives that are derived from inclination and are directed toward some subjective 
external purpose are called hypothetical imperatives. A hypothetical imperative states 
that an action is good for some possible or actual purpose.  Hypothetical imperatives 
“represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something 
else that one wants (or may possibly want)” (414, pg. 25).   
 A categorical imperative, on the other hand, represents an action as objectively 
necessary in itself, without reference to any other purpose or end (414 and 415, pg 25).  A 
categorical imperative commands certain actions with no condition—nor any other 
                                                
1 All references to Kant’s work in this section, unless otherwise stated, refer to 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785/1993) translated by James W. Ellington, 
3rd edition (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company).  The first number in all 
citations refers to the page number in Volume IV of the Royal Prussian Academy edition 
of Kant’s works, while the second number refers to the page number in Hackett’s 3rd 
edition. 
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purpose to be attained by those actions—independently of one’s subjective ends. 2  A 
categorical imperative, then, prescribes actions that are intrinsically worthy – actions that 
are what Kant refers to as ‘ends in themselves.’  Categorical imperatives command acts 
that are objectively necessary in themselves, and their commands apply to us (human 
persons) simply because we have rationality.3  
 This brings us to one of the most important parts of Kant’s account of the nature 
of morality – the intrinsic unconditional worth of a good will.  According to Kant, there is 
only one thing that is good under all conditions, and this a good will.  No other thing, not 
any of the virtues nor even happiness, is good under all conditions.  Any of the virtues, 
any talents or gifts of fortune, even happiness can be bad or wrong under some 
conditions.  All of these other conditionally ‘good’ things and all activities need a good 
will for their good use.  Only a good will, he says, “is good not because of what it effects 
or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; [only a good 
will] is good only through its willing, i.e., is good in itself” and is esteemed higher than 
anything that it could ever bring about to favor some contingent inclination, or even the 
sum of all inclinations (happiness) (394, pg. 7).  In fact, a good will itself is to be 
esteemed above all else, even if it cannot accomplish its purpose: 
[I]f with the greatest effort it should yet achieve nothing, and only the good will 
should remain (not, to be sure, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all the 
means in our power), yet would it . . . still shine by its own light as something 
                                                
2 Also important here is the distinction between subjective ends (“which rest on 
incentives”) and objective ends (“which depend on motives valid for every rational 
being”) (427, pg. 35). 
3 According to Kant, both hypothetical and categorical imperatives apply only to rational 
beings (425, pg. 33). 
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which has its full value in itself.  Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither 
augment nor diminish this value. (394, pg. 8) 
 
And it is only reason that can influence the will and produce a will that is good in itself; 
nothing as subjective and contingent as inclinations can produce a will good in itself 
(396, pg. 9).   
  All human beings possess (the possibility of acting from) a pure will, but also 
possess desires and inclinations that conflict with it.  Even a good will is prone to 
‘subjective restrictions or hindrances’ (397, pg. 9).  The good will along with its 
hindrances are gathered together under the concept of duty.  It is these ‘subjective 
restrictions and hindrances’ that Kant uses to bring out what duty is.  Kant asserts that 
“duty has to be a practical, unconditioned necessity of action” that holds “for all rational 
beings (to whom alone an imperative is at all applicable) and for this reason only can it 
also be a law for all human wills” (425, pg. 33). 
 Kant asserts that there are four different categories of action in regards to duty:  
there are (1) actions that are contrary to duty (that all rational people would consider 
wrong, i.e., killing of innocents); (2) actions that are in accord with duty yet done from 
some indirect (mediate) inclination (such as obeying the speed limit to avoid having to 
pay a fine); (3) actions that are in accord with duty but done from some direct 
(immediate) inclination (i.e., preserving one’s life because one desires to not die); and 
finally (4) actions that are done from duty, even when all inclinations are for something 
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else (397-398, pp. 10-11).  Kant advocates this fourth category of action as being the test 
of a will’s possible goodness.4  
 At this point, Kant outlines three propositions of morality: First, to have moral 
worth, an action must be done from duty (not from inclinations).  This is primary to 
Kant’s entire project. One’s inclinations can change because inclinations are a contingent 
matter, and morality cannot be based upon something so contingent and subjective.  
 All actions that are done willingly, Kant says, are willed based upon some 
subjective principle of volition; these subjective principles of volition are called 
‘maxims’ and take the form: I will do action A in order to achieve purpose P.  Kant’s 
second proposition of morality claims that an action that is performed from duty doesn’t 
have its moral worth in the purpose to be attained by it (the content of the maxim), but in 
the (form of the) maxim in which it is determined.  For example, someone might donate 
surplus food to a soup kitchen.  However, whether this action has moral worth or not does 
not depend on the ‘good’ accomplished by the action (hungry people being fed); rather, 
whether the action has moral worth depends on whether the action is motivated from 
inclination or from duty.  Thus, there is nothing specific in a list of possible actions or 
possible purposes that makes an action good or bad. 
 The third proposition, which Kant claims follows from the previous two, states 
that duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the moral law (398-400, pp. 
11-13).  Inclinations and the effects of actions are too subjective and contingent to 
command moral action.  Only the moral law can command necessarily: 
                                                
4 It is important to note that acting from duty as Kant sees it rules out both motivations of 
selfishness and motivations of more benevolent feelings. 
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Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it nor in 
any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from this expected effect.  
For all these effects … could have been brought about also through other causes 
and would not have required the will of a rational being, in which the highest and 
unconditioned good can alone be found.  Therefore, the pre-eminent good which 
is called moral can consist in nothing but the representation of the law in itself, 
and such a representation can admittedly be found only in a rational being insofar 
as this representation, and not some expected effect, is the determining ground of 
the will.  This good is already present in the person who acts according to this 
representation, and such good need not be awaited merely from the effect. (401, 
pp. 13-14) 
But if the law does not determine the will through any effect or expected effect, what is 
the law that commands the will to moral action?  Because Kant denies that the particular 
content of any maxim determines any action’s moral worth, he claims that only universal 
conformity of the will’s actions to the law as such (not to any law determining particular 
actions) can serve the will as a moral principle for acting.  Therefore, duty is constituted 
by the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law, and every other motive 
is inferior to duty. 
 Now back to categorical imperatives: Only a categorical imperative can direct 
moral action. But Kant also concludes that only the universal conformity of the will’s 
actions to the moral law as such can serve the will as a necessary principle. According to 
Kant, a categorical imperative contains both the objective principle of the law as such, 
and the subjective principle of acting (maxim) of a particular human being.  Because 
Cagle, Lisa Lynette, 2010, UMSL, p. 13 
Kant holds that an end that is objective must hold for all rational beings (in other words, 
it must be universalizable), it is clear how Kant arrives at his primary formulation of the 
categorical imperative, the Formula of Universal Law:  
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law. (421, pg. 30) 
Here Kant is saying that the principle of moral law dictates that we should act only 
according to maxims that we can also will every other rational being to act on.  This is 
the supreme principle of practical reason, according to Kant, and it provides guidance for 
our actions. 
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PART II:  A KANTIAN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE 
A: Kantian Theoretical Reason 
Whereas practical reason deals with deliberations about action, theoretical reason can be 
understood as related to matters of fact and their explanation.  Therefore we can associate 
practical reason with morality and theoretical reason with the realm of epistemology.  
Part of my project in this paper, however, will be to show how these two kinds of reason 
are related, and thus how Kant’s moral theory might help us better answer some 
important questions about knowledge and its value.  
 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant criticizes the traditions in metaphysics that 
rely on the supersensory and the transcendent (that is, anything beyond what is revealed 
by the senses), and shows that reason by itself (without sensory and empirical experience) 
is prone to error. Kant's critique of metaphysics and rationalism leads to a view that the 
only knowledge we can really have is limited to what we can perceive through the senses 
(and perhaps evaluate through reason, but that which is a priori is not knowledge).  Thus 
Kant denies reason’s claims to transcendent insight because claims about God and the 
soul, etc., are exactly the kinds of claims that not all rational beings can accept.  Because 
people cannot experience these things through their senses or empirically, Kant 
acknowledges that people will come up with variations of these ideas.  The conflicting 
versions of people’s ideas on these matters will cause people to fail to communicate with 
each other, fall into conflict, or submit to some despotic and unreasoned authority.  Thus, 
reason by itself – without regard for empirical or sensory experience – is prone to err 
when attempting to reach the goal of knowledge.  
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 Reason’s role is regulative, not constitutive, Kant argues.  That is, reason is 
regulative in that it is not by itself a source of knowledge, but it helps us to correct errors 
and guides us in obtaining further insight.  So while Kant wants to delimit the bounds of 
reason, he doesn’t want to argue that it has no role in our knowledge.  For example, Kant 
also argues that, as regulator, reason is the arbiter of truth in all judgments.  We perceive 
things through our senses all the time, but our senses do not judge.  Kant observes that it 
is only when judgment enters the picture that we can be mistaken: “It is correctly said 
that the senses do not err; yet not because they always judge correctly, but because they 
do not judge at all” (A293).  And reason is what helps us to understand whether our 
judgments are correct or not.  For instance, suppose I dream that I inherited millions of 
dollars from an aunt who recently died.  And suppose that I mistake the content of that 
dream as having actually occurred, and I believe that I really inherited millions of dollars 
from an aunt who recently died. But then I start to doubt my belief.  To decide whether 
my belief is true or not, I need to reason and ask to what extent this belief connects up 
with my other beliefs and to the beliefs of other people.  If my belief doesn’t consistently 
connect up with my own other beliefs and with the beliefs of other people, then I have 
reason to think that my belief is wrong.  As arbiter of judgments, reason’s role is to seek 
unity and consistency in observations: as Kant says, “For the law of reason to seek unity 
is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use 
of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth…” 
(A651=B679).  But more about this below.   
 While it isn’t always apparent how Kant thinks that practical and theoretical 
reason relate to each other, in at least one section of the Critique of Practical Reason 
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entitled “On the primacy of pure practical reason in its connection with speculative 
reason” (5:119-121) he addresses this question. In the second Critique, Kant argues in 
general that pure practical reason has primacy over inclinations and desires; in this 
section he argues that it also has primacy over theoretical reason.  He defines primacy as 
“the prerogative of the interest of one insofar as the interests of others is subordinated to 
it” (5:119).  He claims “all interest is ultimately practical and even that of speculative 
reason is only conditional and is complete in practical use alone” (5:121).  While exactly 
what Kant means in this section (and how it fits in with the rest of his philosophy) is open 
to interpretation, it seems from his arguments here that pure practical reason should guide 
(at least some of) our beliefs, as well as our actions.   
 There are three major concepts in Kant’s practical philosophy that have use in a 
new Kantian analysis of knowledge: (i) Good Will, (ii) Duty, and (iii) Universalizability.  
I will show here how these three major concepts can be understood in a new light as 
pertaining not only to the realm of practical reason, but also to theoretical reason. 
 
B. Good will: Following moral and epistemic duty.  
Kant begins his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals by establishing the 
unconditional and final value of a good will.  A good will, he writes, is the only thing that 
can be regarded as good without qualification, and a good will has intrinsic unconditional 
worth (393 – 394).  A good will is not good because of its effects or accomplishments, 
even if it produces good ends; a good will is good in itself, non-instrumentally.  In other 
words, a good will might have instrumental value, but that is not its only or primary 
value.  As Kant writes: “When [a good will] is considered in itself, then it is to be 
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esteemed very much higher than anything which it might ever bring about merely in 
order to favor some inclination, or even the sum total of all inclinations” (394). 
 While Kant goes on to explain how good will is related to moral duty, it is clear 
that good will is of significant value in its connection to reason, in general.  Kant asserts 
that reason has a special role as it pertains to good will; that is, only reason can shape the 
will and produce a will that is good in itself.  In fact, further support for understanding 
practical reason as guiding at least some of our beliefs can be found regarding good will.  
Practical reason is to guide all actions, and all activities need a good will for their good 
use.  From my understanding of Kant’s account of reason, he assumes doxastic 
voluntarism – that is, that, at least to some extent, we can decide what to believe and 
effectively will to change our beliefs.  From such a stance, it is clear that will is important 
in forming or regulating at least some of our beliefs.  Such doxastic voluntarism includes 
that rational beings have direct voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs, and 
that rational beings have indirect voluntary control over many of their beliefs by, for 
example, examining evidence, seeking justification, opening their beliefs to others’ 
scrutiny, conducting research and improving methodologies, etc.   
 We can see that rational beings do have some direct form of voluntary control 
over the beliefs they form in light of sensory experiences.  For example, take someone 
who is undergoing some sort of experimental pharmaceutical treatment for a long-term 
illness.  The drugs she is taking are known to cause hallucinations, and she has been 
made aware of this possible affect.  Perhaps she very strongly perceives that she is being 
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attacked by a horde of spiders, yet judges that she is not being attacked by a horde of 
spiders.5   
 It is incontrovertible that rational beings have indirect voluntary control over their 
beliefs, at least in the sense of being able to use their reason to examine evidence, seek 
justification, weigh reasons, subject their judgments to the scrutiny of others, etc.  In this 
view, then, at least some beliefs are the type that can be acquired, guided and monitored 
by an intention or by duty – that is, by one’s rational will.  In this view, deliberating, 
seeking justification for belief, and all kinds of other epistemic processes are clearly 
activities through which we exercise intention.  As such, according to Kant’s account of 
practical reason, practical reason and good will must guide the good use of these 
activities.  Epistemic good will involves using reason to guide and regulate our beliefs; 
this will include rational beings being able to recognize reasons as the right (or wrong) 
kind of reasons for belief.  The right kind of reasons for belief might include reliable 
evidence, well-examined justification, and/or testimony of reliable authorities, for 
example.  The wrong kind of reasons for belief will be those that are contingent on our 
inclinations, desires, and what we think will benefit us. 
 The aim of epistemic activities is one or more fundamental epistemic goods.6  
One possible fundamental epistemic good is knowledge.  It is widely agreed that 
                                                
5 Such a person would not be blameworthy should she judge her strong sensory 
experience to indicate she was actually being attacked.  However, if she uses her strength 
of will, along with the various information and understanding she has of the side effects 
of the drug, she is praiseworthy for following her epistemic duty in a very difficult 
situation. 
6 I’m assuming Duncan Pritchard’s understanding of fundamental epistemic goods/goals 
here: for Pritchard, a fundamental epistemic good is any epistemic good whose 
specifically epistemic value is at least sometimes not simply instrumental to any other 
epistemic good.   Non-fundamental epistemic goods are always instrumentally valuable 
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knowledge requires at least true belief, whatever else it might include.  But according to 
the principles laid out above (i.e., doxastic voluntarism and that all activities need a good 
will for their good use), knowledge as a fundamental epistemic goal complying with 
epistemic duty must also always include a good will (epistemic good will as explained 
above).  Such a Kantian account of knowledge might include other elements, but it seems 
clear that one cannot be complying with epistemic duty without a good will. It is 
important to note that a rational being might have a good will without knowledge; this is 
the case because knowledge also involves (at least) true belief, and an agent might have 
good will without true belief.  In this analysis, however, as opposed to some other 
epistemic accounts, true belief would not be the singular fundamental epistemic good. 
 To understand why epistemic duty includes a good will, I turn to Kant’s 
explanation of actions that merely are in accord with duty and those that are from duty.  
True belief is the epistemic counterpart to action merely in accord with duty.  That is, true 
belief might be attained for a variety of reasons and motives that may or may not involve 
good will.  For instance, someone might hold a true belief about the existence of God, but 
only hold that belief because it makes her life more comfortable, or only because she 
passively and lazily assents to the supposed epistemic authority of another without 
subjecting those judgments to the scrutiny of reason.  Knowledge, on the other hand, is 
the epistemic counterpart to action from duty.   While knowledge includes a true belief, 
that true belief must be held through good will for it to count for knowledge.  If I have 
knowledge, I don’t hold the true belief merely because I’m inclined to, or because it lines 
up with my pursued ends.  I might have true beliefs for such reasons, and that is 
                                                                                                                                            
relative to some other epistemic good.  Both fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic 
goods might still be instrumentally valuable relative to some further non-epistemic good.  
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instrumentally valuable.  But for knowledge, my belief must be true, and it must be held 
because I’m complying with my epistemic duty. 
 
C. Epistemic duty: Universalizability 
But what exactly does epistemic duty consist in, and what does a good will look like 
when it comes to epistemic goals?  We know from Kant’s moral philosophy that the 
Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle of practical reason.  But as Onora 
O’Neill7 has pointed out, if practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason, and the 
Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle of practical reason, then the Categorical 
Imperative is the supreme principle of reason, full stop.  Kant doesn’t explicitly say this, 
but in a footnote to his 1786 essay “What is it to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” he writes:   
 To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever 
 one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make 
 the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the 
 use of reason. (8:146n) 
This clearly parallels the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative (The Formula of 
Universal Law):  “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law” (421, pg. 30).  Kant seems to be saying: 
believe (or think) only according to that maxim that could be a universal law.  Where 
Kant sees that it is categorically imperative to will only those actions that rational beings 
can will (i.e., that can be universalized), the epistemic counterpart might be that we 
should only believe those things that rational beings can/should believe (i.e., that can be 
                                                
7 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989. 
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universally believed) on the grounds available to us.  Thus, I know p on grounds G only 
if any rational being would/should believe p on grounds G.  If a rational being would 
refuse to believe p on grounds G, then even if I believe p on grounds G, I don't really 
know p.  I might be merely entitled to believe p on grounds G  (e.g. believe that God 
exists based upon available evidence or personal experiences that I have), but am not 
rationally required to believe p on these grounds; it's optional, and hence not knowledge.   
 It is interesting to note here that, according to this understanding of epistemic duty 
our direct voluntary control over belief seems to be complying with epistemic duty best 
when it has more of a regulative/negative character than a positive/constitutive one.  That 
is, we are best following epistemic duty when exercise more direct control over what not 
to believe than over what to believe.  The control we have over what to positively believe 
seems to be more indirect – in the sense of seeking justification, examining evidence, 
evaluating methodologies, and other such processes.  Our reason judges what reasons we 
have to believe P, to believe not P, or to not believe P.  If through our epistemic good will 
we judge that there are more or better reasons (of the right kind) to believe P than there 
are to believe not P, then we are permitted—and perhaps obliged—to believe P.  If in the 
same way we judge that there are more or better reasons (of the right kind) to believe not 
P, we are permitted—and perhaps obliged—to believe not P.  When we are permitted to 
believe P (or to believe not P), we are also permitted to not believe P, because mere 
permission entails that there is not strong empirical evidence for P (or not P), and thus we 
are not required to believe P (or not P, whatever the case may be). 
 Beliefs about the trans-sensory—for example, beliefs about God—are an 
interesting case here.  According to Kant’s metaphysics and account of theoretical 
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knowledge, we know that there is not enough empirical evidence about God’s existence 
for us to have knowledge about it.  Thus, we cannot be required to believe that God does 
exist (P) or that God doesn’t exist (not P). We're only responsible for the belief about 
which there is some empirical evidence available.  What we can be held accountable for 
is something like failing to conduct an adequate investigation into or failing to be open to 
certain propositions because of certain (conscious or unconscious) inclinations like 
laziness or fear. This is important in that, when we are following our epistemic duty and 
exercising epistemic good will, we don't will to believe certain things (P or not P) based 
upon what is at stake for us.  We have the capacity to do this—to exercise direct 
voluntary control over our beliefs; but we mustn't believe things simply because doing so 
would fulfill our contingent desires and inclinations.  Rather, we use our reason and 
epistemic good will to avoid such maxims that are not from epistemic duty. 
 Epistemic duty involves some very specific things in this analysis.  O’Neill  (1989 
and 1992) discusses three “maxims of common human understanding” (reason) that 
appear in the Critique of Judgment8 that seem to be closely related to the Categorical 
Imperative and support the claim that human knowledge is subject to universalizability.  
These three maxims are: (i) to think for oneself, (ii) to put ourselves in thought in the 
place of everyone else, and (iii) to always think consistently with oneself (§40).  
According to Kant, the first maxim protects against prejudice—that is, it is a maxim 
against the passivity of reason.  The passivity of reason can cause us to be blindly guided 
by others, who may or may not have good will or well-reasoned judgments.  The second 
maxim reminds us that while we should not blindly follow those who claim to have 
                                                
8 But they also appear much earlier in Kant’s Lectures on Logic (“The Jäsche Logic,” 57) 
and also are referenced in “What is Enlightenment?” 
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authority, we must still follow principles of thinking and judgment that are open to other 
rational beings.  The second maxim also helps us to enlarge our thought.  Kant writes that 
it marks a person of enlarged thought “if he disregards the subjective private conditions 
of his own judgment, by which so many others are confined, and reflects upon it from a 
universal standpoint (which he can only determine by placing himself at the standpoint of 
others)” (§40).  The third maxim ensures consistency in our thought, but Kant writes that 
it is the most difficult of the three to attain, and can only be achieved by the combination 
of the first two maxims and after regular observance of them has made our adherence to 
them automatic.  We can achieve consistency in thought and judgment only when we 
genuinely try to judge for ourselves and subject our judgments to the examination of 
others.  However, all three of these maxims work together to give content to epistemic 
duty; any one in itself, or in combination with another but without the third, is 
insufficient to guide our beliefs in compliance with epistemic duty. 
 These three maxims show the implications of the Categorical Imperative as the 
supreme principle of reason. As O’Neill writes, reason is “the lawlike guidance” of both 
thinking and doing9; this supports the claim to the unity in structure of practical and 
theoretical reason.  The maxims also flesh out what our epistemic duty consists in—that 
is, what a good will requires in regards to epistemic goals and regulating our epistemic 
activities. 
 
                                                
9 Onora O’Neill, “Vindicating Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, edited by 
P. Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 301. 
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PART III: THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE 
A.  Outlining the problems…and one promising response to the problems 
One long-standing project in epistemology is the attempt to understand what knowledge 
is and why it is distinctly valuable.  Above, I presented an account of what knowledge is 
based on Kant’s account of Practical and Theoretical Reason.  In this section, I will deal 
with the value of knowledge.  First, I will explain what is meant by the claim that 
knowledge is distinctively valuable, outlining three specific challenges to the claim.  
Duncan Pritchard identifies these three challenges as (1) the Primary Value Problem, (2) 
the Secondary Value Problem, and (3) the Tertiary Value Problem; he also points out a 
related problem, (4) the Swamping Problem.  I draw heavily on Pritchard’s work on 
epistemic value in this section. 
 After addressing the different issues at stake in the claim that knowledge is 
distinctively valuable, I will outline Pritchard’s argument for a virtue epistemic account 
that addresses these problems.  I will show why his account doesn’t come close enough to 
sufficiently addressing these problems, and argue why my account of knowledge is better 
than his as it pertains to these key Value of Knowledge questions. 
 
Value of Knowledge Problem: Why Is Knowledge Distinctly Valuable? 
Each of the different value problems addresses different readings of the claim 
“knowledge is distinctively valuable” (what I’ll refer to as Claim KV).  The Primary 
Value Problem deals with the interpretation of KV as “knowledge is more valuable than 
mere true belief.”  This version of KV is primary in that, if we are not able to explain 
why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, then we cannot address any of the 
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different versions of the value problem that arise from KV.  One answer to this problem 
(suggested by Socrates) is that the value of knowledge over mere true belief is a greater 
practical value: that is, in general, one is more likely to achieve one’s goals with 
knowledge than with mere true belief.   
 However, even if we take this as a successful answer to the Primary Value 
Problem, there is still more to the claim that knowledge is distinctly valuable.  The 
Secondary Value Problem deals with the reading of KV as “knowledge is more valuable 
than any that which falls short of knowledge.”  The problem here is that, even if we can 
address the Primary Value Problem by explaining the greater practical value of 
knowledge over mere true belief (perhaps by adding some characteristic that increases 
reliability, such as justification), this doesn’t show why we should distinctly value 
knowledge over that which falls short of knowledge – namely, mere true belief plus some 
added value-conferring criterion.  
 Furthermore, claiming that knowledge is distinctively valuable seems to suggest 
that “knowledge is more valuable than any epistemic standing that falls short of 
knowledge” not merely by degree, but by kind.  The Tertiary Value Problem deals with 
this reading of KV.  Pritchard claims that we often treat knowledge as being precious, 
unlike that which falls short of knowledge, in that knowledge is at least sometimes 
valuable for its own sake.  He writes that this is a non-instrumental, and therefore final, 
value.  If Pritchard is correct, then any adequate response to the Tertiary Value Problem 
must show that knowledge has final value—that is, value that is not merely instrumental 
to another end.  
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 While many theorists have approached the value problem by starting out trying to 
answer the Primary Value Problem, Pritchard recommends a different approach.  He 
recognizes that, if we can successfully answer the Tertiary Value Problem, then we will 
have sufficiently addressed the Primary and Secondary Problems as well.  According to 
his approach – which I adopt below, our goal is to eventually find a way to show that 
knowledge is of final value in a way in which any epistemic standing which falls short of 
knowledge is not.  But first, I’ll spend some space here addressing what is known as “the 
Swamping Problem.”   
 The Swamping Problem is similar to the Primary Value Problem, but is not 
merely a sub-reading of KV.  The Swamping Problem involves a general axiological 
claim that, if a property (such as justification or a reliable process of production) is only 
instrumentally valuable relative to some other good (such as true belief), and if this 
further good is already present, no additional value is added by the presence of the merely 
instrumentally valuable property.  The Swamping Problem for epistemic value applies to 
any epistemic proposal that treats some epistemic standing as instrumentally valuable to 
the good of true belief.  According to Pritchard, the argument that ‘whatever epistemic 
standing is in question has a practical value that mere true belief doesn’t’ won’t be an 
answer to the Swamping Problem at all.  The Swamping Problem is concerned not just 
with any kind of value, but specifically with epistemic value, Prichard argues; the main 
concern of the Swamping Problem is “how to make sense of the idea that knowledge is 
more valuable than mere true belief because it involves an epistemic standing which 
better serves our specifically epistemic goals – in particular, the epistemic goal of true 
belief” (8).   
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 The Swamping Problem for epistemic value seems to arise from the 
contradictions among three highly intuitive claims:  
(1) The claim that true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic good (“The epistemic 
value conferred on a belief by that belief having an epistemic property is 
instrumental epistemic value relative to the further epistemic good of true belief” 
(p. 12)); Pritchard refers to this view as “epistemic value T-monism” (p. 11); 
(2) The claim about value that “If the value of X is only instrumental value relative to 
a further good and that good is already present, then it can confer no additional 
value” (p. 12); and 
(3) The claim that knowledge is at least sometimes more epistemically valuable than 
mere true belief. 
It is important to note here that Pritchard draws a distinction between fundamental 
epistemic goods and final value.  According to Pritchard, a fundamental epistemic good is 
any epistemic good whose specifically epistemic value is at least sometimes not simply 
instrumental to any other epistemic good.  Non-fundamental epistemic goods are always 
instrumentally valuable relative to some other epistemic good.  Both fundamental and 
non-fundamental epistemic goods might still be instrumentally valuable relative to some 
further non-epistemic good.   
 The claim that true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic good means that all 
other epistemic goods are instrumental to the epistemic good of true belief.  If we accept 
(1) and (2) as true, then necessarily we must reject (3) as false.  The triad is inconsistent, 
and the Swamping Problem asks us to try to make it consistent. 
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 Pritchard finds that there is no good reason to reject (2), and thus takes it for 
granted. We might deny (3), but we would need to deny it as part of a larger explanation 
of why we tend to think that (3) is true.  This is the tactic of proponents of the ‘practical 
response’ to the Swamping Problem: they claim that the seeming greater epistemic value 
of knowledge over true belief is really just that knowledge is generally more practically 
valuable than true belief.  To deny the very weak claim of (3), however, is to advocate a 
very strong alternative claim – that knowledge is never of greater epistemic value than 
mere true belief.  The further problem with denying (3) is that (3) could claim that any 
epistemic standing is at least sometimes more epistemically valuable than mere true 
belief, which would contradict with (1); thus our denial of (3) entails our affirmation that 
no epistemic standing is ever of more epistemic value than mere true belief. This is a very 
strong thesis indeed.  Even if a proponent of this strategy is willing to accept such a 
strong thesis, she must still (a) offer a plausible story as to why we might be wrongly 
inclined to think of (3) as true, and (b) argue that the Tertiary Value Problem is really not 
a problem at all (since it asks why knowledge is more valuable in kind – why it uniquely 
has final value – than that epistemic standings that fall short of knowledge, and we must 
deny the assumption that knowledge has final value since it is inconsistent with (1)).  
Pritchard does not deny this as a plausible strategy outright; instead he opts to examine 
whether alternative proposals to solving the inconsistent triad of the Swamping Problem 
are plausible and able to solve the Tertiary Value Problem without denying it as a 
problem. 
 If we accept (2) as given, and we’re looking for alternatives to denying (3), then 
we must examine whether we can plausibly deny (1).  We can deny (1) in two very 
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different ways: first, we can simply deny that true belief is the sole fundamental 
epistemic good without denying some sort of monism (that there is only one fundamental 
epistemic good), or we can reject epistemic value monism entirely and instead endorse 
epistemic pluralism (p. 16).   Both of these views can be used to support the claim that 
knowledge is a fundamental epistemic good – either the only fundamental epistemic good 
(value monism) or one of multiple epistemic goods (value pluralism), one of which could 
also be true belief – and thus bypass the Swamping Problem.  Pritchard asserts that 
whether we try to adopt value K monism, or we try to adopt value pluralism and argue 
that both knowledge and true belief are fundamental epistemic goods, we still need to 
demonstrate that knowledge is also finally valuable in order to be able to extend the 
pluralist response to the Tertiary Value Problem. 
  
Does Knowledge Have Final Value? (Can we answer the Tertiary Value Problem?) 
To address the Tertiary Value Problem (the problem of explaining why knowledge is 
more valuable in kind than that which falls short of knowledge), Pritchard argues, we are 
required to explain why knowledge has final value, unlike those epistemic standings that 
fall short of knowledge.  Pritchard examines one account of why knowledge has final 
value, but concludes that it is ultimately unsuccessful at answering the value problem.  
However, the examination of this account brings to light some important concerns 
regarding epistemic value and defining knowledge. 
The account that Pritchard finds most promising to explain why knowledge has 
final value is what he calls robust virtue epistemology—a view he attributes to Ernest 
Sosa, Linda Zagzebski, and John Greco.  According to Pritchard, a virtue-theoretic 
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epistemology proposal is robust if “it attempts to exclusively analyse knowledge in terms 
of a true belief that is the product of epistemically virtuous belief-forming processes” 
(24). Pritchard focuses on three major benefits he attributes to robust virtue-theoretic 
accounts:  
(1) virtue-theoretic accounts line up with our strong intuition that knowledge is 
 the product of an agent’s reliable cognitive abilities,  
(2) robust virtue epistemology accounts seem to have the resources to deal with 
 Gettier-style cases of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck (intervening luck, in 
 this case), and  
(3) robust virtue epistemology accounts also line up with the common view that 
 knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement, in that achievements in general are 
 successes because of one’s ability, and virtue epistemology seems to be claiming 
 the epistemic analogue. 
 
Regarding (3), in this view knowledge is cognitive success because of one’s 
cognitive abilities.  Knowledge is then just a specifically cognitive type of achievement, 
but only in that one’s success if primarily creditable to her abilities (rather than to luck or 
some other external factor that is not dependent on her abilities).  This is the achievement 
thesis, but it is formulated here specifically in regards to knowledge.  The achievement 
thesis combined with robust virtue epistemology entails the knowledge-as-achievement 
thesis (K=A), that knowledge is a type of achievement.  This is significant because 
achievements are considered distinctively valuable – specifically, the successes that are 
described as achievements are of final value (not valuable merely in relation to any 
Cagle, Lisa Lynette, 2010, UMSL, p. 31 
further goal or practical benefit). This is the Value of Achievement thesis. Thus, Pritchard 
reasons, if we can show that knowledge is a type of achievement – unlike that which falls 
short of knowledge – then we may be able to show how knowledge has a distinct kind of 
value that lesser epistemic states lack.  Pritchard outlines the argument thus: 
(P1) Achievements are successes that are because of ability. (Achievement thesis) 
(P2)  Knowledge is a cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability.  
   (Robust Virtue Epistemology) 
(C1) So, [from P1 and P2 we conclude that] knowledge = cognitive achievement.  
(K=A thesis) 
(P3) Achievements are finally valuable. (Value of Achievement thesis) 
(C2) So, [from C1 and P3 we conclude that] knowledge has final value.  
(Pritchard, 30) 
While the inferences in this argument are valid, Pritchard argues that the robust virtue 
epistemological account of knowledge (P2) faces severe problems, particularly in its 
generation of the false K=A thesis (C1).   
 The K=A thesis is highly problematic.  For example, there are cases in which 
knowledge doesn’t involve the corresponding cognitive achievement, and likewise there 
are cases of cognitive achievements that don’t equal knowledge (33).  In particular, this 
account has problems with cases that involve another type of knowledge-undermining 
epistemic luck—environmental epistemic luck.  This is the kind of luck involved in the 
much-discussed barn cases. In these types of cases involving environmental luck, an 
epistemic agent uses a reliable process to form a true belief and thus has a cognitive 
achievement; but nevertheless we don’t count this cognitive achievement as knowledge 
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because the environment is epistemically inhospitable to the extent that the agent’s belief 
is only true as a matter of luck.  So while robust virtue epistemology can deal 
successfully with Gettier-style cases (intervening epistemic luck), it is not able to answer 
the problem of environmental epistemic luck.  Thus, there is at least sometimes more to 
knowledge than mere cognitive achievement, which denies (C1).  If (C1) is false, then 
either (P1) or (P2) must also be false.  Pritchard concludes that (P2) must be false 
because the environmental epistemic luck challenge not only undermines the K=A thesis 
(C1), but also the specifically robust virtue epistemology claim that knowledge is 
cognitive success that is because of an agent’s cognitive ability (P2). 
 Pritchard thus denies that exhibiting cognitive achievement is sufficient for 
possessing the corresponding knowledge.  But he also denies that obtaining knowledge is 
sufficient to have a cognitive achievement.  He introduces the ‘Jenny’ case – a case of 
testimony – in which young Jenny asks an adult passer-by for directions, and the adult 
(who has first-hand knowledge of the city) gives her the directions she has requested.  It 
seems in this case that Jenny has knowledge – the correct directions that the passer-by 
gave her, but he claims that this acquisition of knowledge isn’t primarily creditable to 
Jenny or to her cognitive agency.  Since according to our account of robust virtue 
epistemology a true belief needs to be primarily creditable to the agent to constitute a 
cognitive achievement, Jenny may have knowledge in this case, but Pritchard thinks that 
it does not seem to exhibit a cognitive achievement. It seems that Pritchard might think 
that some cases of testimony (in which knowledge is gained) exhibit a type of cognitive 
achievement, but not in a strong sense.  This, like the epistemic luck problem, is a 
challenge to both (C1) and to (P2).  This is another way in which we see that knowledge 
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can’t be identified with cognitive achievement.  Thus not only is the K=A thesis 
problematic (C1), but the robust virtue epistemological account of knowledge (P2) is also 
significantly flawed.  Even if (P2) weren’t seriously flawed, it still wouldn’t maintain its 
appeal since without the K=A thesis it loses its unique resources to argue for the final 
value of knowledge; the robust virtue epistemology account, then, seems unable to 
address the Tertiary Value Problem that we set out to solve.  Pritchard concludes that, 
since robust virtue epistemology was the only promising view for accounting for why 
knowledge is distinctly and finally valuable, but it proved unsuccessful in developing 
such an account, the Tertiary Value Problem cannot be overcome. 
 
Pritchard’s Solution: Knowledge is Sometimes of Final Value 
With these new insights from examining robust virtue epistemology, Pritchard develops 
what he calls an anti-luck virtue epistemology theory that he claims incorporates the 
strengths and major intuitions of robust virtue epistemology, but also avoids its 
weaknesses and problems.  Since Pritchard sees the robust virtue epistemological account 
as most promising to solve the Tertiary Value Problem, Pritchard concludes that we can’t 
sufficiently answer why knowledge is more valuable in kind than that which falls short of 
knowledge. Therefore, Pritchard does not try to show how this new anti-luck account can 
address the Tertiary Value Problem, but he does aim to show where the intuition that 
grounds the Tertiary Value Problem – the intuition that knowledge is distinctively 
valuable – comes from. 
 Pritchard argues that, while robust virtue epistemology and other virtue-theories 
come close to offering a correct understanding of knowledge, ultimately they fail in not 
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recognizing that there are two master intuitions about knowledge.  Other virtue accounts 
accommodate for the ability intuition (that knowledge is the product of an agent’s 
cognitive abilities when knowledge as cognitive success can be significantly credited to 
the agent).  But only anti-luck virtue epistemology also accommodates the anti-luck 
intuition – that if one has knowledge then it is not the case that one’s true belief could 
easily have been false (52).  These two master intuitions impose distinct demands on 
one’s theory of knowledge.  Anti-luck virtue epistemology gives equal weight to both of 
these fundamental intuitions, and incorporates both an anti-luck and an ability condition 
that constrain what is considered knowledge. 
 The account of knowledge offered by anti-luck virtue epistemology is structured 
as follows:  knowledge is true belief that couldn’t have easily been false that arises out of 
a reliable cognitive character, such that one’s cognitive success is to a significant degree 
creditable to one’s cognitive character (55).  The ‘true belief that couldn’t have easily 
been false’ element is the anti-luck condition in the view, and virtue-theoretic element is 
the ability condition.  This formulation of the ability condition is different than the ability 
constraints of the robust virtue epistemology account he introduced earlier; this version 
does not demand that the cognitive success be entirely because of an agent’s cognitive 
ability, but rather only that the cognitive success should be to a significant degree 
creditable to one’s cognitive character.  Thus anti-luck virtue epistemology shies away 
from a strictly achievement account of knowledge.   
 The ability condition formulated in this way accommodates ‘Jenny’ type cases in 
which an agent’s cognitive success isn’t strictly creditable primarily to her cognitive 
abilities.  As long as Jenny’s (or another agent’s) true belief is at least partly creditable to 
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her, we can count her as having knowledge.  The degree of cognitive ability required in 
order to know is dependent on how epistemically friendly the environment is.  If Jenny is 
in an environment where the anti-luck condition can be easily satisfied (for instance, a 
place in which there are many honest and reliable informants), then the bar for her 
cognitive ability in order to be able to know is quite low.  But if Jenny is in an 
epistemically unfriendly environment (perhaps where there are lots of deceptive 
informants), the degree of cognitive ability required for her to gain knowledge is quite a 
lot higher.   
 Anti-luck virtue epistemology doesn’t only accommodate ‘Jenny’ type cases, but 
it also responds well to various problems within epistemology, such as in response to 
Gettier-style intervening epistemic luck cases, and the even more problematic cases of 
environmental epistemic luck.  Pritchard also notes that this account with its anti-luck 
condition can deal with ‘lottery’ cases, in which an agent’s true beliefs based upon their 
cognitive abilities could very easily have been false.  Since anti-luck virtue epistemology 
with its two major constraints of knowledge – the anti-luck condition and the ability 
condition – seems to successfully respond to a wide variety of problems in epistemology, 
it seems that there is much initial support for the view. 
 But Pritchard still must address how anti-luck virtue epistemology can handle the 
value problem. Pritchard concluded in his discussion of robust virtue epistemology that 
the proposal most likely to be able to account for the final value of knowledge (and thus 
adequately respond to the Tertiary Value Problem) is actually untenable; thus, he claims 
that anti-luck virtue epistemology need only respond to the Primary and Secondary Value 
Problems and be able to diagnose why the Tertiary Value Problem appears as a problem.   
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 Pritchard thinks that anti-luck virtue epistemology has very good resources to be 
able to offer a diagnostic account of the Tertiary Problem, and to also respond to the 
Primary and Secondary Problems.   To address the Tertiary Problem, Pritchard reminds 
the reader that in the previous chapter he declared that knowledge is not finally valuable, 
but that cognitive achievements are distinctively (finally) valuable.  Because knowledge 
sometimes (but not always) involves cognitive achievement, then, knowledge is also 
sometimes finally valuable when it is a cognitive achievement.  Pritchard notes that the 
exemplary cases of knowledge we think about tend to be cases in which the knower has 
the corresponding cognitive achievement (for example, we don’t think of ‘Jenny’ type 
testimony cases as being paradigm cases of knowledge, he says).   Because knowledge 
and cognitive achievement often overlap, it is natural to suppose that knowledge itself is 
of final value, even though it is actually cognitive achievement that has final value.  
Because fundamental epistemic goods are those which are at least sometimes valuable, 
knowledge can still be a fundamental epistemic good under this account.  So in this 
sense, knowledge sometimes has final value – when it is also a cognitive achievement. 
 Pritchard claims that Craig’s10 account of the genealogy of the concept of 
knowledge suggests the beginnings of an adequate answer to the Secondary Value 
Problem, and thus also the Primary Value Problem.  In this account, knowledge has a 
distinctive epistemic standing that is particularly instrumentally valuable.  Thus we could 
argue that knowledge is of more value instrumentally than that which falls short of 
knowledge.  This account should be developed further. 
                                                
10 Edward Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991. 
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 Finally, Pritchard addresses how anti-luck virtue epistemology responds to the 
Swamping Problem.  As I mentioned above, knowledge is sometimes of final value 
(because it sometimes constitutes a cognitive achievement), and is therefore a 
fundamental epistemic good. Thus, according to Pritchard, it doesn’t matter that 
knowledge is not always of final value; knowledge at least sometimes has additional 
value over mere true belief, which does not have final value.  Pritchard thinks this a good 
answer to the Swamping Problem. 
  
B. Why Pritchard’s response is inadequate 
Pritchard concludes that the Tertiary Value Problem (the problem of explaining why 
knowledge is more valuable in kind than that which falls short of knowledge) is 
unsolvable because, in his account, knowledge doesn’t always have final value.  While he 
thinks the Tertiary Value Problem unsolvable, Pritchard thinks that his account 
adequately addresses the Secondary Value Problem (the problem of why knowledge is of 
more epistemic value than any proper subset of its parts) and the Primary Value Problem 
(the problem of why knowledge is of more epistemic value than true belief) by showing 
that knowledge is an exercise of skill.  Because skill and ability are sometimes cases of 
achievements, and achievements have final value, he says that knowledge sometimes has 
final value.  If knowledge sometimes has final value, then sometimes it is more valuable 
than any proper subset of its parts and more valuable than true belief, Pritchard argues.   
 The problem with Pritchard’s answer is that he seems to want to solve the Tertiary 
Value Problem for all cases, which is why he thinks the ‘knowledge is sometimes of final 
value’ answer fails to adequately address this problem.  But he seems satisfied to solve 
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the Primary and Secondary Value Problems for only some cases.  He needs to explain 
more explicitly why he thinks this is an adequate response for the Primary and Secondary 
problems, but not the Tertiary Problem.  
 It would seem that an answer to the Primary Value Problem should explain why 
knowledge is always more valuable than true belief.  Likewise, it seems that an answer to 
the Secondary Value Problem should explain why knowledge is always more valuable 
than any proper subset of its parts.  If there is an account of knowledge that answers both 
the Primary and Secondary Value Problems for all cases, it would seem to be a better 
account of the value of knowledge.  If another account of knowledge could explain why 
knowledge always has final value (and thus adequately answer all three of the value 
problems, along with the Swamping Problem), this account would be clearly superior to 
Pritchard’s as far as addressing these key Value of Knowledge problems.   
 My Kantian account of knowledge outlined in Part II above offers an response for 
all three of the value problems, solving the Tertiary and Primary Problems along with the 
Swamping Problem not in just some but all cases, and offering a promising start to 
addressing the Secondary Problem.  My account is thus superior to Pritchard’s for 
addressing the key questions of the Value of Knowledge.  I will outline how my account 
better addresses these problems in the following section. 
 
C. How my Kantian analysis of knowledge better addresses these problems  
As stated above, Pritchard recognizes that, if we can successfully answer the Tertiary 
Value Problem, then we will have sufficiently addressed the Primary and Secondary 
Problems as well.  To accomplish this, he says our goal is to show that knowledge is of 
Cagle, Lisa Lynette, 2010, UMSL, p. 39 
final value in a way in which that which falls short of knowledge is not.  Pritchard could 
not achieve this goal with his anti-luck virtue epistemology.  But my Kantian analysis of 
knowledge shows that knowledge is clearly of final value in a way that true belief (or any 
other epistemic state that falls short of knowledge) is not. 
 According to my analysis of knowledge, knowledge always includes both good 
will and true belief.  Because good will has final value, and knowledge must always 
include an agent utilizing good will, knowledge always has final value.  True belief, on 
the other hand, does not have final value.  True belief is of conditional value—unlike 
knowledge—and is (at least sometimes) merely instrumental to knowledge as a rational 
epistemic agent can hold a true belief but lack good will. As I argued above, true belief is 
the epistemic counterpart to Kant’s category of action merely ‘in accord with duty’ 
because true belief might be attained for a variety of reasons and motives that may or 
may not involve good will. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the epistemic counterpart to 
Kant’s category of action ‘from duty.’   While knowledge includes a true belief, that true 
belief must be subjected to the universalizability criterion of the epistemic counterpart of 
the Categorical Imperative, along with the other maxims of ‘common human 
understanding’ examined above.  For it to count that I have knowledge, my belief must 
be true, and it must be held because I’m complying with my epistemic duty. 
 Because my analysis of knowledge shows why knowledge always has final value 
while true belief does not, it adequately answers two of the three key value problems for 
knowledge, along with the Swamping Problem:  
 Primary Problem: Because knowledge has final value (and true belief does not), it 
is more valuable than mere true belief;   
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 Tertiary Problem: Because knowledge has final value (and true belief and other 
epistemic standings do not), knowledge is more valuable in kind than any epistemic state 
that falls short of knowledge. 
 Swamping Problem: Because knowledge has final value it is at least sometimes 
not simply instrumental to any other epistemic good.  This makes knowledge a 
fundamental epistemic good.  Whether or not there are other fundamental epistemic 
goods that include true belief (that is, whether or not my Kantian account of knowledge 
turns out to be a monist or pluralist account of fundamental epistemic value), it is clear 
that knowledge is not merely instrumental to true belief or any other epistemic good.  
This addresses the epistemic version of the Swamping Problem. 
 In my account, knowledge is a fundamental epistemic good.  I find it likely that 
there are other fundamental epistemic goods, including true belief and possibly some 
other epistemic states.  The important thing for addressing the value of knowledge and 
epistemic Swamping Problem is that true belief is not the only fundamental epistemic 
good under this account.  Knowledge is of final value, and is thus not merely 
instrumental to any other epistemic good, including true belief. 
 While Pritchard thinks that successfully addressing the Tertiary Value Problem 
will also give an adequate response to both the Secondary and Primary Problems, I have 
some doubt.   
 The Secondary Value Problem deals with the reading of KV as “knowledge is 
more valuable than any that which falls short of knowledge.”  The problem here is that, 
even if we can address the Tertiary Value Problem by explaining the greater value of 
knowledge over mere true belief by adding some characteristic such as good will, this 
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might not sufficiently show why we should distinctly value knowledge over that which 
falls short of knowledge – namely, mere true belief plus some added value-conferring 
criterion.  The Secondary Problem as Pritchard lays it out leaves me perplexed because it 
is not clear whether this reading of KV means that we must show why knowledge is more 
valuable than any epistemic standing that falls short of knowledge, or whether we must 
show why knowledge has more value than both any epistemic standing that falls short of 
knowledge (such as true belief) and any other proper subset of its parts (including why 
knowledge is more valuable than good will + true belief). 
 In either reading, I think it is important in solving the Secondary Value Problem 
to address the anti-luck quality that we seem to think that knowledge has.  Similar to the 
virtue epistemology account that Pritchard criticizes and the one he offers, my Kantian 
analysis of knowledge is open to a credit view. That is, Kant thinks that acting from duty 
is morally credit-worthy for the agent, but acting merely in accord with duty is not credit-
worthy (not blameworthy necessarily, either).  The epistemic counterpart here would be 
that true belief attained by complying with epistemic duty (that is, through good will) is 
of credit to the rational being.   
 Let’s lay this out a bit more clearly.  There seem to be three different types of luck 
cases that we need to address: good luck cases of true belief, bad luck cases of false 
belief, and good luck cases of true belief that could have easily been false.  Good luck 
cases of true belief are not of credit to the agent.  For example, suppose Peter looks at his 
friend and says (and believes that), “There are four one-dollar bills in your left rear 
pocket.”  Let’s suppose that Peter doesn’t have any good reason for thinking there are 
four one-dollar bills in his friend’s left rear pocket—he’s just guessing.  But luckily 
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enough, Peter has made a good guess; there are indeed four one-dollar bills in his friend’s 
specified pocket.  Even though Peter has obtained a true belief, it is not of credit to him in 
any significant way.  He hasn’t complied with his epistemic duty in any meaningful way, 
and though we don’t find his guess necessarily blameworthy, it is obviously not credit-
worthy.  He hasn’t complied with his epistemic duty in any significant way, thus his 
lucky true belief is not of credit to him, and he does not have knowledge. 
 There are other cases, however, in which a rational being might be complying 
with her epistemic duty—which is credit-worthy, but she might still not have knowledge 
because she lacks true belief.  One example of this kind of bad luck case with good will 
might be a type of case in which an agent uses resources available to her to examine the 
evidence of a particular proposition, but some sort of knowledge-undermining epistemic 
luck intervenes in an unpredictable way to provide her with a false belief.  For instance, 
let’s suppose that Maggie sees what appears to be a class of milk on the kitchen table.  
She doesn’t have any strong reason to think it’s not a glass of milk, but doesn’t just 
assume that it is a glass of milk, and goes over to look more closely at it, smell it, etc.  
After examining the liquid in the glass and noticing that it conforms to several of the 
most obvious characteristics of milk (color, consistency, smell), she forms the belief, 
“There is a glass of milk on the table.”  She has complied with her epistemic duty by 
examining the empirical evidence available to her, etc.; however, the glass is actually 
filled with some non-milk liquid that normally would not be in her kitchen but bears a 
striking resemblance to milk.  In this situation, Maggie is credit-worthy for complying 
with her epistemic duty (she sought justification), but she doesn’t have knowledge 
because she lacks true belief.   
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 But these two types of luck cases are easy to deal with.  The difficult epistemic 
luck cases are those such as good luck cases of true belief that could easily have been 
false.  This includes both Gettier-style cases and barn cases.  My account doesn’t at this 
point offer a specific anti-Gettier (or anti-barn case) component, though it is perhaps open 
to further development.  Thus, Gettier-style cases and barn cases might still present 
questions for my account, but these kinds of cases don’t seem to me to be viciously 
problematic for my account.  However, epistemic duty might require that for situations in 
which it is very important for other reasons to be right about belief, that you investigate 
as much as you can.  For instance, it is very important (i.e., for the sake of the health and 
life of a child) for an agent to know that she’s not giving spoiled milk to a baby.  In this 
scenario, epistemic duty might require more than it otherwise would in service to some 
other requirement—the moral requirement to do no harm, perhaps, or to not be negligent.  
Her epistemic duty requires in this situation that the epistemic agent investigates as much 
as she can.  For an average agent (someone who doesn’t have special milk-examining 
skills), this would include not just looking at the milk (even though we think of sight as a 
fairly reliable sense), but also using the other senses to smell, taste, touch, etc., the milk 
to make sure that it is not spoiled.   
 However, there could be some situations in which, though we come to the correct 
judgment, we still might easily have been wrong.  If the true belief is obtained by the 
epistemic agent because of her compliance with good will (that is, because she sought 
justification, examined the evidence, followed the maxims of common human 
understanding as they applied to the situation, etc.), she is still credit-worthy and has 
gained knowledge, even if she might have easily been wrong.  This seems to me a 
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sufficient response to the Gettier and barn cases, even if it does not solve them in every 
situation, since the problems such cases involve are not always vicious. 
 Even if this is not a sufficient response to the luck cases, I have sufficiently 
addressed the Secondary Problem of showing why knowledge has not just final value 
because it includes a good will, but also has more value than both true belief and any 
other proper subset of its parts (including good will + true belief).  Knowledge has value 
above and beyond any subset of its parts because of the anti-luck quality that arises from 
its components.  The anti-luck quality of my view is not ad hoc; it arises out of the 
components of knowledge, but isn’t a separate component from them. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, I have presented a novel analysis of knowledge, drawing from Kant’s 
account of practical and theoretical reason. While this approach may seem similar to 
some virtue epistemic accounts, it is unique in its explicit relying on duty and the Kantian 
universalizabilty criterion.  This Kantian account of knowledge better addresses the three 
key value problems for knowledge, as well as the epistemic version of the Swamping 
Problem, than Pritchard’s promising anti-luck virtue epistemology account. 
 There are some significant limitations to my account here, however.  There is a 
wide range of problems in epistemology that my account has yet to fully address.  For 
instance, Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology explains why we don’t think of cases 
like Gettier’s cases and barn cases as representative or typical cases of knowledge.  
Pritchard claims that this is because there are two primary intuitions about knowledge: an 
ability intuition and an anti-luck intuition.  It is possible that the Kantian account of 
knowledge I’ve offered could include some sort of condition that would better address 
these intuitions as well.  However, it would need to be shown what such a condition 
might look like and why such a condition as a component of knowledge is not merely ad 
hoc.  But the account I’ve offered here does deal with some of the luck problems, and is 
open to other necessary or sometimes present components of knowledge. 
 One other possible point of contention might regard the doxastic voluntarism of 
my account.  Critics of doxastic voluntarism will question to what extent it makes sense 
to think that we can decide what to believe and effectively will to change our beliefs.  I 
presented some examples above concerning at least some situations in which it seems 
possible to exercise direct voluntary control over our beliefs.  And my account 
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specifically shows that epistemic duty discourages epistemic agents from exercising 
voluntary control over their beliefs for the wrong kind of reasons (inclinations, etc.).  
Even if we cannot have direct control over what or whom we come to believe on what 
grounds, we can exercise gradual control to some extent to acquire the habits of mind that 
epistemic duty consists in.  In this way, epistemic agents can be praiseworthy (credit-
worthy) or blameworthy in regards to their voluntary and willful compliance with 
epistemic duty.  My account of knowledge offers a novel understanding of doxastic 
voluntarism that I would like to further explore. 
 My Kantian analysis of knowledge has some pretty interesting implications, as 
well.  For instance, my account might mean that we need to reinterpret what gives 
rational beings like humans special dignity and thus special moral standing.  Kant thinks 
that humans have a special dignity in their rationality, and thus some kind of special 
value.  Neo-Kantians interpret the special dignity of humanity to reside in the capacity for 
moral rational choice and rational agency.  My account, however, recognizes the unity of 
the structure of practical and theoretical reason, and thus indicates that we should 
reexamine this claim.  One goal for further research might include fleshing out an 
argument that we should read the special dignity of humans as rationality, full stop, 
which includes not only rational choice, but also the kind of rational judgment 
epistemology deals with.  This argument might conclude that beings who can think things 
for (the right kind of) reasons have dignity, and thus moral value. 
 Lastly, since Kant’s moral theory includes an understanding of virtue as “the 
moral strength of a human being's will in fulfilling his duty” (6:405), a Kantian analysis 
of knowledge such as mine might be open to some appealing parts of various virtue 
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ethics accounts.  Kant shows an interest in both moral virtues as strength of fulfilling 
one’s moral duty and non-moral virtues that are at very least of instrumental and/or 
prudential importance in overcoming obstacles such as contrary interests or desires (see, 
for example, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View). This account gives a good 
explanation as to why we think of open-mindedness and independent thought as 
important to the pursuit of knowledge (see the discussion on the maxims of ‘common 
human understanding’ above). 
 My analysis of knowledge offers an exciting way of understanding the goals and 
duties of ethics and epistemology as overall integrated and unified.  Further explanation 
is needed of why, if these pursuits can be unified, why our epistemic goals might 
sometimes seem to contradict our moral goals. There is clearly more work to be done, but 
the novel approach offered here might serve to reinvigorate the search for answers that 
meet the challenges to our understanding of knowledge and its value. 
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